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: Active Differential Privacy Budget Management

Active Differential Privacy Budget Management
Background
Datasets and data derived therefrom may include and/or reveal information regarding one
or more individuals whose records are contained in the dataset. For example, a dataset from a
medical study may include an age of an individual who participated in the medical study.
Oftentimes, such data and/or the release thereof is the subject of privacy concerns. For example,
data from a dataset may be combined with other data (e.g., publically available data, etc.) to
reveal the identity of individuals whose records are contained in the dataset. This is generally
undesirable. Therefore, removing personally identifiable information (PII) such as names, Social
Security numbers, and the like from a dataset is often not enough to ensure that the dataset does
not reveal information regarding individuals whose records are contained in the dataset and/or
preventing data from the dataset from being linked back to such individuals. For example, in the
1990’s it was shown that “anonymized” records (e.g., records with direct identifiers such as
names, etc. removed) summarizing information about hospital visits could be directly linked to
their subject by cross-correlating the anonymized records with voter registration data. This is
generally referred to as privacy leakage. It is worth noting that privacy leakage can still occur
where primary data (e.g., an element directly contained in a dataset, etc.) is not released. In
many scenarios, the release of results produced by analyzing a dataset (e.g., statistical measures
such as mean, median, standard deviation, etc.) may similarly cause privacy leakage. Indeed, an
individual need not be included in a dataset for the release of results produced by analyzing the
dataset to cause privacy leakage of information regarding the individual. For example, an
insurance provider may learn of a study on heart disease indicating that, of those sampled,
individuals with brown hair had a significant increase in heart attacks, and may know that client
Fred has brown hair (and therefore an increased risk of heart attack based on the study), and may
increase Fred’s insurance premium as a result.
To solve this challenge and facilitate the release of data without violating individuals’
privacy, systems and methods of differential privacy were developed. Differential privacy
facilitates the quantification of privacy leakage and provides formal privacy guarantees regarding
the release of data such as datasets. However, often differential privacy guarantees (e.g.,
quantifying an amount of privacy leakage associated with a release of data, etc.) must be
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developed on a case-by-case basis. For example, the amount of privacy leakage associated with
a release of information may depend on the type of analysis used to generate the information
being released. Moreover, each release of information may incur additional privacy leakage.
For example, if many different information releases occur, the total privacy leakage may grow
even though the privacy leakage of each individual release is limited. Policy makers often want
to limit the total privacy leakage, which requires composing the individual privacy leakage of
each release. Therefore, it is often necessary to review these factors manually to develop an
accurate model of privacy leakage and/or determine countermeasures to ensure adequate privacy
(e.g., adding random noise to the information released, etc.).
However, in many scenarios it may be unrealistic to manually review every release of
information (e.g., manually compose the privacy leakage from every release of information, etc.)
to ensure differential privacy. For example, in the online-retail environment, retailers may
request daily summaries from advertisement-serving platforms regarding the effectiveness of
their ad-campaigns. For an ad-serving platform having thousands or hundreds of thousands of
customers, manually reviewing each request to determine if it would exceed the desired total
privacy leakage may be infeasible. Therefore, there is
a need for systems and methods that facilitate
programmatic access (e.g., those that limit an amount
of manual review required, etc.) to datasets and/or data
derived therefrom (e.g., statistical measures, etc.).
Described herein is a platform for providing access to
datasets and/or data derived therefrom while
maintaining differential privacy (e.g., quantifying
privacy leakage and/or limiting total privacy leakage,
etc.). Moreover, a number of usability features to
improve the ease of user interaction with the platform
are discussed.
Overview
Referring now to FIG. 1, a method of
processing a user query for data is shown. εB may
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refer to a privacy budget. In various embodiments, εB is specific to one or more factors. For
example, εB may be a privacy budget for a specific customer for a specific data-day. Data-days
are discussed in greater detail below. εB may be a static variable (e.g., every customer has the
same privacy budget, etc.) or may be a dynamic factor (e.g., some customers are given different
privacy budgets, etc.). In various embodiments, εB is a real number. For example, εB may be
equal to 1.78. M may be a model limit. For example, M may be a limit of a model per customer
per data-day. In some embodiments, M is equal to 100. However, other values are possible. ε0
may be an overall query privacy budget. In various embodiments, ε0 = εB/M. L may be a userspecified input-filtering 2-norm limit. In various embodiments, the method includes one or more
pre-calculation operations. εN is a noise privacy budget. In various embodiments, εN is equal to
ln(1+(eε0-1)/p)=fN(p, ε0), where p is a user-specified sampling ratio (e.g., to discard rows, etc.).
Referring generally to FIG. 1, the method may include receiving a query such as a query
for statistical measures (e.g., mean, median, standard deviation, variance, etc.) associated with a
dataset such as a dataset describing user engagement with online content (e.g., online ads, etc.).
For example, a database may include records describing a number of online interactions with
content items and identifiers (e.g., device identifiers, etc.) associated with the number of online
interactions and an individual may query the database to retrieve information associated with the
number of online interactions (e.g., aggregate volume of interactions, interactions by device type,
etc.). In various embodiments, the query is received from an external computing system such as
a computing system associated with a retailer.
In various embodiments, the method includes calculating an overall query privacy budget
ε0. In various embodiments, ε0 is equal to εB/M. In some embodiments, the method includes one
or more usability features, discussed in detail below, which may affect the value of ε0. In various
embodiments, the method includes determining L. In various embodiments, row contribution
filtering facilitates preventing users from skewing outputs. For example, row contribution
filtering may prevent users from injecting a single row having a large value for inputs, thereby
skewing the outputs. In some embodiments, L is determined based on a default limit (e.g., an
upper and/or lower bound, etc.). For example, the default limit may vary dynamically based on
various factors (e.g., by customer, by user, by query type, etc.). Additionally or alternatively, L
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may be determined based on a hard limit (e.g., an upper and/or lower bound, etc.). In various
embodiments, row contribution filtering requires users to pre-commit to a maximum row size.
In various embodiments, the method includes comparing a privacy budget associated
with the query to an allowed (e.g., remaining, etc.) privacy budget associated with the
user/customer. For example, a particular query may relate to information spanning a number of
data-days and comparing the privacy budget associated with the query to the allowed privacy
budget may include checking the privacy budget for each data-day in the query with the
remaining privacy budget for each data-day (e.g., using budget database, etc.). If there is
sufficient remaining privacy budget to enable the query, the method may proceed to analyze the
dataset based on the query. Alternatively, if there is insufficient remaining privacy budget to
enable the query (e.g., the query is over budget, etc.), the method may include transmitting an
error (e.g., describing that the query is over budget, etc.). In some embodiments, transmitting the
error includes spending an amount of privacy budget (e.g., due to the release of information
associated with the error, etc.).
In various embodiments, the method includes performing one or more pre-calculations
(as described above). For example, the method may include determining a user count associated
with the query to determine whether the query relates to a sufficient number of users (e.g., isn’t
producing granular data on a single user/device, etc.). For example, the method may include
determining the user count associated with the query and comparing the determined user count to
a threshold. If the query relates to an insufficient number of users (e.g., too few users, the
determined user count is less than the threshold, etc.) the method may include transmitting an
error. In some embodiments, transmitting the error includes spending an amount of privacy
budget (e.g., due to the release of information associated with the error, etc.). If the query relates
to a sufficient number of users, the method may proceed to generate a model associated with the
query. For example, the method may include generating a linear regression model of the form
y=mx+b describing conversion information associated with a number of online interactions. In
various embodiments, the method includes transmitting results associated with the model and/or
the query such as a slope and/or a y-intercept associated with the model (e.g., m and/or b in the
example above, etc.). In various embodiments, the results are transmitted to an entity that
submitted the query. In various embodiments, the method includes spending a privacy budget
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associated with the query. For example, the method may include updating a budget database to
reflect the privacy budget used for each data-day associated with the query and/or transmitted
results.
In various embodiments, the method described above may be implemented using one or
more computing systems. For example, the method may be implemented using a distributed
processing system having one or more processing circuits, each including one or more processors
and one or more memories, the memories having instructions stored thereon that, when executed
by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processing circuits to perform the various
operations described herein.
Discussion of Factors Affecting Privacy Budgets and/or Usability
Before turning to various possible augmentations of the method/system described above,
various factors affecting privacy budgets and/or usability are discussed.
Budgets
In various embodiments, customers may share a privacy budget. For example, a number
of customers that routinely request information derived from a data source may all share a
privacy budget. Additionally or alternatively, customers may receive their own budget. In
various embodiments, information is organized into datasets. For example, device interaction
data may be organized into a dataset according to a source of the data. In various embodiments,
each dataset receives its own budget.
Over Budget: What Happens?
In various embodiments, the method described above may transmit an error in response
to determining that a query violates (e.g., exceeds, etc.) an amount of allotted/remaining privacy
budget. In some embodiments, transmitting the error includes transmitting an error without
supplemental information (e.g., information describing a cause of the error, etc.). In some
embodiments, transmitting the error includes transmitting an error with supplemental
information. For example, the error may include information describing which day(s) exceeded
the privacy budget and/or that a specific user has exceeded their allotted budget (e.g., a customer
has remaining budget but an individual associated with the customer that is making the query has
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exhausted their portion of the customer budget, etc.). Additionally or alternatively, the method
may include removing data-days that have exhausted budgets from the query and re-running the
query. For example, the method may include identifying one or more data-days included in the
original query that have exhausted budgets and generating an augmented query based on the
original query by removing the one or more data-days from the original query. In various
embodiments, each error-handling method is associated with an amount of privacy budget spend.
For example, a first error including a large amount of supplemental information may be
associated with a larger expenditure of privacy budget than a second error including no
supplemental information.
Determining a User Count
As described above, the method may include one or more pre-calculations such as
determining a user count. In various embodiments, determining the user count includes
determining a noisy user count (e.g., a count of user associated with a query with random noise
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added to the count, etc.). In some embodiments, the user count is calculated using partition
selection as described in “Differentially private partition selection” (Desfonaines et al., 2020).
Usability Features
Referring now to FIG. 2, another method
of processing a user query for data is shown. In
various embodiments, the method of FIG. 2 is
similar to the method of FIG. 1 with added
usability features. In various embodiments, r is a
user-specified privacy ratio per query. For
example, r may allow users to generate queries
having more noise, thereby conserving a greater
amount of privacy budget per query. In some
embodiments, r is equal to 1/M. In various
embodiments, the privacy budget εB may
comprise a normal portion and a reserve portion.
For example, εB may include a reserve portion
that may be activated by a system administrator
(e.g., of a system implementing the method of
FIG. 2, etc.). In various embodiments, the reserve
portion may be used in emergency situations
where the normal budget is inadvertently
consumed (e.g., through an incorrectly
parameterized query, via an inexperienced user, etc.). In some embodiments, a whitelist
including users that may access the reserve portion may be maintained to determine access to the
reserve portion. In various embodiments, calculating r*εB improves usability of the
method/system for users. For example, a user may select a value of r, thereby enabling a larger
number of higher-noise queries than otherwise possible. In some embodiments, user selection of
r is only available to a select number of users specified by a whitelist. In various embodiments,
these features may facilitate preventing a single individual (e.g., an inexperienced junior data
scientist, etc.) from inadvertently spending an entire customer’s privacy budget allocation on a
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single query (e.g., an incorrectly parameterized query, an overbroad query, etc.). In some
embodiments, the number of queries per user and/or per customer are limited (e.g., user can only
make 5 queries a day, etc.).
In various embodiments, the method facilitates sandbox models. For example, the
method may enable users to test out query parameters on a fake dataset (e.g., a generated dataset
that does not include real online interaction data, etc.). In this way, users may determine query
parameters through trial-and-error without spending on privacy budgets.
In various embodiments, the method of FIG. 2 may be implemented using one or more
computing systems. For example, the method may be implemented using a distributed
processing system having one or more processing circuits, each including one or more processors
and one or more memories, the memories having instructions stored thereon that, when executed
by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processing circuits to perform the various
operations described herein.
In various embodiments, the methods/systems described here may facilitate the
methodical release of information in a differentially private manner by tracking access
characteristics associated with datasets (e.g., which datasets were accessed and what information
was accessed from those datasets, etc.).
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Abstract
A data processing system may facilitate the methodical release of information in a
differentially private manner by tracking access characteristics associated with datasets. The
data processing system may maintain a privacy budget allocation for entities and/or users and
may calculate privacy budget expenditures based on queries submitted by the entities and/or
users. The data processing system may process entity and/or user queries for information from
one or more datasets and may track privacy budget expenditures in relation to privacy budget
allocations.
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